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OPINION

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Before us is the appeal of James O’Neal-Sloane from the District Court’s order
denying his motion seeking a reduction in his sentence. The District Court rejected his
motion for a reduction under Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which
provides for a retroactive two-level reduction in the base offense level for offenses
involving crack cocaine under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706
(Nov. 1, 2007) (hereafter, “Amendment 706”). His principal argument is that the District
Court erred in sentencing him as a “career offender” under the Guidelines. We are not
persuaded.
I.
O’Neal-Sloane’s sentence followed convictions for distribution and possession
with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and for being
a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Because of
O’Neal-Sloane’s prior state-court convictions, the District Court found that he was a
career offender, and calculated a total offense level of 37 and a criminal history category
of VI. It sentenced O’Neal-Sloane to a term of 360 months in prison. Shortly thereafter,
O’Neal-Sloane filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The District
Court denied that motion and this court declined to issue a certificate of appealability.
2

In December 2007, the Sentencing Commission added Guidelines Amendment 706
which reduced the base offense level for offenses involving crack cocaine by two levels.
It later added Amendment 713 which made the base offense level reductions retroactive
beginning March 3, 2008, U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (March 3, 2008). See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(c). Based on Amendment 706, O’Neal-Sloane filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) 1 to reduce the sentence for his crack cocaine offense, which the District Court
denied.2 The order denying that motion is the subject of this appeal. The Government
argues that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to reduce O’Neal-Sloane’s previously
imposed sentence.
II.
Because O’Neal-Sloane was sentenced as a career offender, his sentence cannot be

1

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides:

in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term
of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§] 994(o), upon motion of the
defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its
own motion, the court may reduce the term of
imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in
section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such
a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission.
2

We review a district court’s ultimate decision whether to
grant or deny a defendant’s motion to reduce his or her sentence
under § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mateo,
560 F.3d 152, 154 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009).
3

reduced under Amendment 706 unless we first determine that his career offender status
was error. In United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2009), we held that “the
lowering of the base offense level under § 2D1.1(c) has no effect on the application of the
career offender offense level. . . .” Nonetheless, O’Neal-Sloane argues that
“[j]urisdiction lies [to reconsider his career offender status in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding]
because [his] entitlement to the two-level reduction for crack offenses . . . is inextricably
bound up with the merits of his status as career offender.” Appellant’s Br. at 24-25.
However, although 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is the mechanism by which a prisoner may
seek to have his sentence reduced because of a retroactive amendment to the Guidelines,
district courts have no authority “to reconsider [their] prior determination to apply the
career offender guidelines . . . .” Mateo, 560 F.3d at 156.
As noted in Mateo, adopting O’Neal-Sloane’s contention would contravene the
statutory text. Id. Section 3582(c)(2) states that any sentence modification must be
“consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
The relevant Guidelines policy statement, as revised after Amendment 706, requires a
court to
determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the
defendant if the amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) had been in
effect at the time the defendant was sentenced. In making such determination, the
court shall substitute only the amendments listed in subsection (c) for the
corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was
sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.
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U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) (emphases added).
The procedure available for a motion for reduction in sentence based on a
defendant’s erroneous designation as a career offender is provided by 28 U.S.C. §
2255(a), rather than by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Section 2255(a), provides that a “prisoner
in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming . . . that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the . . . laws of the United States . . . , may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”
O’Neal-Sloane’s prior motion under § 2255 was unsuccessful. Before a
successive § 2255 motion may be considered by the District Court, it must be certified by
a three judge panel of the court of appeals to contain:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as
a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)-(2). Neither provision pertains here. See In re Dorsainvil, 119
F.3d 245, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting arguments that a new judicial opinion
constitutes newly discovered evidence and that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a
criminal statute constitutes a new rule of constitutional law).
O’Neal-Sloane contends that even if he cannot make a second motion under §
2255, the District Court should have construed his motion as a petition for habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and the “safety valve” clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), which we
5

interpreted in In re Dorsainvil.3 119 F.3d at 249. O’Neal-Sloane’s reliance on our
decision in In re Dorsainvil is misplaced. In that case, we noted that the safety-valve
could be used only if § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a
prisoner’s] detention.” In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)).
That was the situation in In re Dorsainvil, where the petitioner was in an “unusual
position” as a prisoner who, without the safety-valve, would have had no opportunity to
challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive law could
negate with retroactive application. Id.
Whereas the petitioner in In re Dorsainvil may have been confined for conduct the
Supreme Court later deemed not to be criminal, O’Neal-Sloane has no similar claim and
there is no doubt that his confinement is lawful. His situation is therefore unlike that
presented in In re Dorsainvil which turned on the “complete miscarriage of justice”
presented by the exceptional circumstances in that case. Id. at 251 (quoting Davis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1974)). Arguably, an incorrect classification as a
career offender would be a miscarriage of justice but O’Neal-Sloane does not present
such a case.

3

In his brief, O’Neal-Sloane also argued that the District
Court could have construed his motion under § 3582(c)(2) as a
petition for a writ of coram nobis. At oral argument, however,
O’Neal-Sloane stated through counsel that he was abandoning that
theory, acknowledging that the writ of coram nobis “doesn’t apply”
to this case. Tr. of Oral Argument at 22.
6

Underlying O’Neal-Sloane’s classification as a career offender is his 2001
conviction for simple assault under Pennsylvania law. Under the Pennsylvania statute, a
person is guilty of simple assault if he “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another. . . .” See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2701 (emphasis added).4 A
career offender must have had “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (emphasis added).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a crime of violence is an offense punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that has as an element, inter alia, “the use of .
. . physical force against the person of another” or “involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)-(2).
In United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2009), we considered
whether a conviction of simple assault in Pennsylvania should be treated as a conviction

4

Pennsylvania’s simple assault statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 2701, says, in relevant part:
A person is guilty of assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another;
(2) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly
weapon;
(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury; or
(4) conceals or attempts to conceal a hypodermic needle on
his person and intentionally or knowingly penetrates a law
enforcement officer or an officer or an employee of a
correctional institution, county jail or prison, detention
facility or mental hospital during the course of an arrest or
any search of the person.
7

of a crime of violence. We accepted the Government’s interpretation of Begay v. United
States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), as holding that a crime involving negligent or reckless
conduct was not a crime of violence for career offender purposes. Johnson, 587 F.3d at
210-11. On the other hand, we held that if the conduct was intentional or knowing, the
conviction under Pennsylvania’s simple assault statute is a crime of violence. Johnson,
587 F.3d at 210-11.
The relevant facts about O’Neal-Sloane’s 2001 simple assault conviction are set
forth in the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s opinion affirming the jury’s verdict.
Commonwealth v. O’Neal-Sloan, No. 01698MDA01 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). He was
charged with punching his girlfriend in the eye and causing abrasions on her knees and
elbows. Id. at 6. Although he denied the charge, the jury found him guilty. Id. at 7-8
(quoting the trial court’s finding that O’Neal-Sloane “knowingly caused bodily injury to”
his girlfriend); see also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (permitting
reliance on express findings by the trial judge in determining whether a prior state-court
conviction is a violent felony). It follows that O’Neal-Sloane’s simple assault was
intentional and thus a crime of violence under Johnson. See 587 F.3d at 212 (“[A]n
intentional or knowing violation of [Pennsylvania’s simple assault statute] is a crime of
violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).”). In light of the conduct underlying O’NealSloane’s simple assault conviction, which satisfies the crime of violence requirement for
classification as a career offender, we find no miscarriage of justice in the District Court’s
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decision to impose O’Neal-Sloane’s original sentence.
III.
For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying
O’Neal-Sloane’s motion to reduce his sentence.
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